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Abstract
The wormhole attack is a severe attack that can be easily
mounted on a wide range of wireless networks without com-
promising any cryptographic quantity or network node. In
the wormhole attack, an attacker sniffs packets at one point
in the network, tunnels the packets through a wired or wire-
less link to another point. Such kind of attack can cause se-
vere problems in wireless sensor networks, especially dete-
riorate the routing process and the localization process. In
this paper, we propose a secure localization scheme against
wormhole attacks, which includes three phases: wormhole
attack detection, neighboring locators differentiation and
secure localization. The main idea of the proposed secure
localization scheme is to build a so-called conflicting set
for each locator according to the abnormalities of message
exchanges among neighboring locators, which is used to
differentiate the dubious locators from valid locators for
the secure localization. The simulation results show that
the proposed scheme outperforms the existed schemes un-
der different network parameters.
1. Introduction
In most wireless sensor network (WSN) applications,
such as emergency response systems, military field oper-
ations, and environment monitoring systems, the inanition
of measurement data without location information makes
the self-localization capability a highly desirable charac-
teristic of the systems. Most localization algorithms for
WSNs estimate the positions of location-unknown nodes
based the position information of a set of nodes (locators)
and the inter-node measurements. The localization tech-
niques can be classified into range-based and range-free [1]
schemes. Range-based localization assumes that the dis-
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tances between sensors and locators can be estimated by
using different measurements, such as the arrival time (ToA
[2]), the time difference of arrival times (TDoA [3]), the
arrival angel (AoA [4]), or the received signal strength in-
dicator (RSSI [5]), etc. Range-free localization relies on
other features of the network, such as hop counts [4], cen-
troid [6], APIT [1], amorphous computation [7], directional
antenna [8], signal fingerprinting [9], etc.
Despite the recent advances of localization in WSNs,
most of the existing localization systems are vulnerable un-
der the adversarial scenario where malicious attacks can
disturb the localization process. For example, a simple re-
play attack may defunct the distance measurement, lead-
ing to the malfunction of the range-based localization tech-
nique. Therefore, security is a significant characteristic of
the localization process in the hostile environment.
The attackers, which threaten the localization of the sen-
sor nodes in a hostile WSN, can generally be classified
into two categories, external attackers and internal attack-
ers [10]. External attackers can distort network behaviors
without the system’s authorization, while internal attack-
ers are authenticated ones and thus more devastating to the
security of the system. The wormhole attack, which is a
severe attack, can be easily launched by two colluding ex-
ternal attackers. In this paper, we will analyze the impacts
of the wormhole attacks on the localization procedure in
WSNs.
In our early work [11] [12], secure localization schemes
are proposed to defend against wormhole attacks under a
simplified system model where all types of nodes have the
identical transmission range, the nodes can receive all the
transmissions without any message collisions, and attackers
will relay all received packets without any message drop-
offs. Under such system model, the sensor can easily detect
the existence of the wormhole attack and provide depen-
dance against the attack during localization process. How-
ever, these schemes do not work well when a general sys-
tem model is considered where the transmission ranges of
different types of nodes are different, the nodes may miss
certain packets due to message collisions, and attackers
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may randomly drop off packets they overheard. In this pa-
per, therefore, we consider the localization problem under
this general system model and propose a Secure Localiza-
tion scheme Against Wormhole attacks called SLAW, which
works well under this system model. The SLAW consists of
three phases: wormhole attack detection, neighboring loca-
tors differentiation and secure localization. The main idea
of the SLAW is to make use of the properties of the network
to detect the existence of the wormhole attack and to build
a so-called conflicting set for each locator so as to identify
the dubious locators for the secure localization process.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows: 1) We propose a wormhole attack detection ap-
proach which can detect the existence of a wormhole at-
tack when the localization process of a sensor node is under
the wormhole attack; 2) We propose to use the conflicting
set of each locator to differentiate sensor’s neighboring lo-
cators. Two independent algorithms are proposed to work
for different wormhole attacks; 3) We propose a novel se-
cure localization scheme which is divided into three phases:
wormhole attack detection, neighboring locators differenti-
ation and secure localization; 4) We conduct simulations to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme with
a general system model under different network parameters.
2. Related Work
The security of localization has been well studied in
the past few yeas. The approaches of providing secure
localization for WSNs in hostile environments are sum-
marized in [13]. Most of these solutions achieve secu-
rity by using cryptography (such as the global preloaded
key in ROPE [14] and the network-wide group key in
DRBTS [15]), detecting nodes’ misbehavior (such as ma-
licious beacon signals in [16], time-bounded nonces in [17]
and position validity in [18]) verifying location information
(such as the verifiable multilateration in SPINE [10] and the
distance verification in ROPE [14]), filtering out erroneous
and outlier data (attack-resistant MMSE [19]), making sta-
tistical decision (such as voting-based scheme in [19] and
reputation-based scheme in DRBTS [15], robust statistical
method in [20]), etc. As all these approaches are applica-
tion dependent, their performance is affected by the types
of attacks and the allocated resources.
As wormhole attacks are launched with external attack-
ers which do not need to compromise any system cryptog-
raphy, they cannot be defeated by using cryptographic solu-
tions. Thus, the researchers have proposed some wormhole
attack detection approaches: The “packet leashes” mech-
anism [21] uses geographical and temporal leashes to de-
tect whether or not the packets are attacked by wormhole
attacks. A similar approach is proposed in [22] based on
end-to-end location information rather than hop-by-hop ge-
ographical leaches. Another set of wormhole prevent tech-
niques [23, 24] use the round-trip time of packets as a mea-
surement to determine the existence of wormhole attacks,
which are similar in nature to temporal packet leaches.
EDWA [25] use end-to-end hop counts to detect the worm-
hole attack and pinpoint location of the attackers. Wang
et al. [26] propose to detect wormholes by visualizing the
entire network topology with some anomalies introduced
by attacks. [27] uses the network connectivity information
to detect wormhole attacks based on the fact that the inde-
pendent neighbors of two non-neighboring nodes are upper-
bounded. A topological approach is proposed in [28] to de-
tect the wormhole attacks. In [29], a localized algorithm
that detects the wormhole attacks directly using the connec-
tivity information implied by the underlying communica-
tion graph is designed, and it requires no specialized hard-
ware, which makes it practical in the real-world scenarios.
However, all the above wormhole detection schemes em-
phasize the detection without considering the localization
scenario.
The directional antennae are used in the SeRLoc [8] to
detect the wormhole attack based on the sector uniqueness
property and communication range violation property, and
the secure localization can be achieved after identifying the
attacked locators. HiRLoc [30] further improves the SeR-
Loc by utilizing antenna rotations and multiple transmit
power levels, which provide more information to increase
the localization accuracy. The schemes in [19] can also be
applied in localization against wormhole attacks. SeRLoc
and HiRLoc, however, cannot obtain satisfied localization
performance as some attacked locators may still be unde-
tected, and [19] does not suit for the scenario when many
locators are attacked. SLAW proposed in this paper applies
a novel mechanism to achieve better performance without
using extra hardware such as directional antennae required
in SeRLoc and HiRLoc.
3 System Model
3.1 Network Model
We assume that three types of nodes are deployed in the
network: locators, sensors, and attackers. The locators have
their locations known in advance (by manual deployment or
GPS devices). Each locator has its own unique identifica-
tion. The sensors do not know their locations and they can
estimate their locations by measuring distances to neighbor-
ing locators via message exchanges. The attackers exist in
pairs colluding with each other to launch a wormhole attack.
We assume that the transmission range of the sensors, loca-
tors and attackers is RS , RL and RA respectively. For sim-
plicity of description, we assume RS ≤ RL ≤ RA, as shown
in Figure 1. Note that the secure localization scheme pro-
posed in this paper works well in other cases where RS , RL
and RA vary different. For the communication between two
colluding attackers, however, their communication range is
unlimited as they can communicate with each other using
certain communication technique. We also assume that the
communication channel is not ideal. Even within the trans-
mission range, a packet may be lost due to the transmission
collision.
When the sensor needs self-localization, it broadcasts
a location request message Loc req to its neighboring lo-
cators. Upon receiving the requesting message, each
neighboring locator replies an acknowledgement message
Loc ack to the sensor. The sensor will use the received
Loc ack messages to build the set of its neighboring loca-
tors. The sensor can estimate the distances to all the locators
based on the Loc ack message by using the RSSI method
and estimate its location using the maximum likelihood es-
timation (MLE) approach. Further more, the sensor mea-
sures the response time of each locator, which will be used
to countervail the locator’s random delay at the MAC layer.
3.2 Attack Model
We consider an adversarial environment where the local-
ization procedure of the sensor may be attacked by a worm-
hole attack. During the wormhole attack, one attacker sniffs
packets at one point in the network, forwards them via the
wormhole link to another point of the network. We assume
that the wormhole link is bi-directional and symmetrical so
that the packets could be transmitted via either direction and
no region is attacked by more than one wormhole simulta-
neously. Note that if the length of the wormhole link is less
than RA, then both attackers will be within the transmission
area of each other such that the packet transmitted by one
attacker can be received by the other attacker, resulting in
endless packet transmission loop. To exclude this excep-
tional scenario, we assume the length of the wormhole link
is larger than RA. In order to make the wormhole attack
more general, we assume that the attackers can randomly
change their transmission powers for the packet retransmis-
sions; they can also randomly drop off part or all of the
packets they have overheard. However, we do not consider
the case that the attackers can intensionally drop off certain
types, or modify certain fields, of received packets. This
is because we treat the wormhole attackers as external at-
tackers which cannot acquire the content, such as the type
of the packet, or modify the content, such as the recorded
time stamp, of any overheard packet. The case that the at-
tackers act as internal attackers that can break through the
system’s authentication protection is out of the discussion
of this paper.
Figure 1 shows that if the sensor S uses the RSSI method
in the localization, the wormhole can forward the packets
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Figure 1. Wormhole attack in the range-based
localization.
from the locators L4, L5 and L6 to S , S will obtain the
same distance measurement d0 instead of the actual dis-
tances d′4, d
′
5 and d
′
6, as the RSSIs from L4, L5 and L6 just
reflect the propagational attenuations from A2 to S . Note
that the neighboring locators of S may include locators out-
side the transmission range of the sensor due to the exis-
tence of the wormhole link. Obviously, when S receives
messages relayed by the wormhole, it will use false dis-
tance measurements for the self-localization. We can also
see that, for packets traversing two paths from a locator,
say L5, to S , the one going through the wormhole link, i.e.,
L5 → A1 → A2 → S , will take a longer delay to reach S
than the one going directly from L5 to S .
Upon the view of the sensor, the locators within the sen-
sor’s vicinity are classified as the following categories due
to the existence of wormhole attack:
Definition 1. Neighboring locator: The locators which can
communicate with the sensor, either via the wormhole link
or not, are defined as the neighboring locators (N-locators)
of the sensor.
Definition 2. Valid locator: The neighboring locators,
which can communicate with the sensor directly, are called
valid locators (V-locators) because their messages can be
directly received by the sensor to obtain correct distance
measurements. The distance between each V-locator and
the sensor is less than RL.
Definition 3. Dubious locator: The locators, which are
within the transmission range of the attacker and can com-
municate with the sensor via the wormhole link, are defined
as dubious locators (D-locators) since their distance mea-
surements can negatively affect the localization procedure.
The distance between each D-locator and the attacker is less
than RL.
We denote the set of N-locators, V-locators, D-locators
as LN , LV and LD, respectively. For the sample
network shown in Fig 1, for the sensor S , LN =
{L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6}, LV = {L1, L2, L3, L4} and LD =
{L4, L5, L6}. It is obvious that LN = LV ∪ LD Note that
L7 does not belong to any set since it is not a N-locator of
S . We also denoteDR(u) as a disk centered at u with radius
R.
4 Secure Localization Scheme Against
Wormhole Attacks
The wormhole attack can disrupt the localization proce-
dure of the sensor only if the sensor enters the transmission
area of either attacker and communicates with the locators
via the wormhole link. Two different types of wormhole
attacks, named Class 1 wormhole attack (Figure 2(a)) and
Class 2 wormhole attack (Figure 2(b)), are defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 4. Class 1 wormhole attack: The sensor is under
class 1 wormhole attack when the message it transmits can
arrive at itself via the wormhole link. That is, the distance
between the sensor and one of the attackers is less than RS
and the distance between the sensor and the other attacker
is less than RA.
Definition 5. Class 2 wormhole attack: The sensor is under
class 2 wormhole attack when it can exchange messages
with some locators via the wormhole link, but cannot re-
ceive its own message. That is, the distance between the
sensor and one of the attackers is less than RS , while the
distance between the sensor and the other attacker is larger
than RA.
Without special treatments, the localization process
would be deteriorated when the sensor is under a wormhole
attack. Therefore, the critical task for the sensor is to detect
the existence of the wormhole attack and to identify the du-
bious locators to achieve secure localization. The proposed
SLAW includes the following three phases:
• Wormhole Attack Detection: The sensor detects
whether it is under a wormhole attack using wormhole
detection schemes.
• Neighboring Locators Differentiation: When a worm-
hole attack is detected, the sensor identifies its N-
locators as D-locators and V-locators.
• Secure Localization: After identifying the D-locators,
the sensor uses valid locators to conduct the MLE lo-
calization with the correct distance measurements.
The procedure of the SLAW is shown as follows:
1: When the sensor receives messages from neighboring
locators, it runs wormhole attack detection process.
2: if the wormhole attack is detected then
3: The sensor runs neighboring locators differentiation
process.
4: The sensor runs secure localization process.
4.1 Wormhole Attack Detection
In a hostile WSN where wormhole attacks exist, the sen-
sor has to detect whether it is attacked by a wormhole be-
fore conducting the self-localization. The sensor broadcasts
a Loc req message and waits for the reply messages, i.e.,
the Loc ack messages from its neighboring locators. When
receiving the Loc req message, each locator responds a
Loc ack message. The sensor will use the received Loc ack
messages to build the set of its neighboring locators. It also
measures the distance to each neighboring locator from the
received Loc ack message. Further more, the sensor mea-
sures the response time of each locator.
When building the set of neighboring locators, the sensor
may observe some abnormalities occur due to the existence
of the wormhole attack. The following four properties can
be used to detect the existence of the wormhole attack.
Node’s self-exclusion property: Each node can not receive
any message transmitted by itself in a loop-free path.
Detection scheme D1 based on node’s self-exclusion
property: When the sensor is under the class 1 worm-
hole attack like Figure 2(a), it can detect the wormhole at-
tack simply as follows: When the sensor S broadcasts the
Loc req message, as A1 lies in DRS (S ), it can receive the
message from S , and then relayed through the wormhole
link to A2, after relayed by A2 this message can arrive at
S as S lies in DRA (A2). Similarly, the broadcasted Loc req
message may also travel from A2 through the wormhole link
to A1 and then being received by S . Therefore, the sensor
can determine that it is under a wormhole attack if it re-
ceives the Loc req message sent by itself.
Packet unduplication property: Each node can receive at
most one copy of the same message from one of its neigh-
boring nodes.
Detection scheme D2 based on packet unduplication
property: As shown in Figure 2(b), a dubious locator L4
may lie in the common area of the regions DRS (S ) and
DRL (A1). When L4 responses S ’s Loc req message, the
Loc ack messages can be received by S twice, one directly
from L4 and the other from A2 which is replayed from A1
to A2 through the wormhole link. Therefore, if S receives
more than one message from the same neighboring locator
for each request, it determines that it is under a wormhole
attack.
Neighboring nodes’ spatial constraint property: Each
node cannot receive messages from its two neighboring
nodes simultaneously if the distance between them is larger
than 2RS .
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Figure 2. Illustrations of wormhole attack: (a) Class 1 wormhole attack; (b) Class 2 wormhole attack.
Detection scheme D3 based on neighboring nodes’ spa-
tial constraint property: As shown in Figure 2(b), L2 is
a locator which lies farther than 2RS away from L8. After
receiving the Loc req message from neighboring locators,
S will check whether the distance between any two locators
is larger than 2RS . If S detects that the distance between
L2 and L8 is larger than 2RS , it derives that it is under a
wormhole attack.
The wormhole detection procedure is shown as follows:
1: Broadcast a Loc req message.
2: Wait for the Loc ack messages to measure the distance
and calculate the response time of each locator.
3: if detect the wormhole attack based on scheme D1 then
4: Class 1 wormhole attack is detected.
5: else if detect the wormhole attack based on schemes D2
or D3 then
6: Class 2 wormhole attack is detected.
7: else
8: No wormhole attack is detected.
Since the algorithms that deal with class 1 and class 2
wormhole attacks are independent, the sensor needs to de-
termine the type of the wormhole attack after the wormhole
attack detection. However, if considering the general net-
work model that packet loss exists during the message ex-
changes because of either the packet transmission collisions
or the packet drop-off by the wormhole, the sensor may de-
tect the type of the wormhole attack incorrectly. That is,
when the sensor is under a class 1 wormhole attack, it may
fail to detect the class 1 wormhole attack with the detection
scheme D1 but detect a class 2 wormhole attack with the
detection schemes D2 or D3. The way to mitigate the im-
pact of this mistake is that, when the sensor receives packets
from itself or from any neighboring locator for three times
(this scenario happens only when the sensor is under the
class 1 wormhole attack, as L4 in Figure 2(a)) during the
neighboring locators differentiation, it will rectify that it is
under the class 1 wormhole attack instead of the class 2
wormhole attack and re-conducts the algorithm for the class
2 wormhole attack.
4.2 Neighboring Locators Differentiation
The core idea of these neighboring locators differenti-
ation algorithms is to allow all locators to build their so-
called conflicting sets, which are based on the abnormali-
ties of the Beacon message exchanges among neighboring
locators. By analyzing the conflicting sets of neighboring
locators, the sensor can differentiate dubious locators from
valid locators. The conflicting set is defined as follows:
Definition 6. Conflicting set: The conflicting set of a loca-
tor Li, denoted as C(Li), contains all the abnormal neighbor-
ing locators of the locator Li, including (1) Li itself if it can
receive the Beacon message sent by itself, (2) neighboring
locators that are within the transmission range of Li but send
several copies of the same Beacon message through differ-
ent paths to Li, and (3) neighboring locators that are outside
the transmission range of Li but their Beacon messages can
be received by Li.
Based on the periodical Beacon message exchanges with
its neighboring locators, each locator can build its conflict-
ing set. When a locator detects the Beacon message abnor-
mality, it will put the locator (the source node of this Bea-
con message) into its conflicting set. When such a locator
receives a Loc req message from the sensor, it responses a
Loc ack message including its conflicting set to the sensor.
The following theorem shows the relationship among the
locater Li, its conflicting set C(Li), and DRA (A1), DRA (A2),
DRL (A1) andDRL (A2):
Theorem 1. Given a network shown in Figure 3, (1) if Li
lies in DRA (A2) \ DRA (A1), all the locators in C(Li) lie in
DRL (A1); (2) if Li lies inDRA (A1) \DRA (A2), all the locators
in C(Li) lie inDRL (A2); (3) if Li lies inDRA (A1) ∩DRA (A2),
all the locators in C(Li) lie inDRL (A1) ∪DRL (A2).
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As shown in Fig 3, the locators L1, L2, L3 lie inDRA (A2)\
DRA (A1), the locator L4, L5 lie in DRA (A1) ∩ DRA (A2), and
the locators L6, L7, L8 lie in DRA (A1) \ DRA (A2). Take the
locator L3 for example, after each locator broadcasts the
Beacon messages, L3 detects its conflicting set as C(L3) =
{L4, L5, L7, L8} (or a subset of C(L3) when packet loss ex-
ists). For the locator L4, its conflicting set is C(L4) =
{L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L7, L8} (or a subset of C(L4) when the
packet loss exists). L6 cannot be a conflicting node of any
locator as it lies out ofDRL (A1) ∪DRL (A2).
The sensor S can build a conflicting matrix of its n neigh-
boring locators as follows:
Mc =

m11 m12 . . . m1n
m21 m22 . . . m2n
...
...
. . .
...
mn1 mn2 . . . mnn

Where
mi j =
{
1, if L j ∈ C(Li);
0, if L j < C(Li).
Due to the packet loss, the conflicting matrix is not
symmetric, e.g., for some i, j, mi j , m ji. To make the
confliction relationship among the locators more reliable,
we adopt the conservative strategy to handle the conflict-
ing set. For the conflicting matrix, the sensor conducts
mi j = m ji = (mi j & m ji). That is, if Li ∈ C(L j), the sen-
sor will consider the relationship as valid only if L j ∈ C(Li).
For instance, the locator L6 in Figure 3 may include L3 into
its conflicting set, but L6 cannot be in the conflicting set of
L3 as A1 is outside the transmission range of L6. So the
sensor will consider it as invalid.
After this operation, the result of the conflicting sets for
the locators can be summarized as follows: Given a sample
network as shown in Figure 3, (1) if Li lies in DRL (A2) \
DRA (A1), all the locators in C(Li) lie in DRL (A1); (2) if Li
lies in DRL (A1) \ DRA (A2), all the locators in C(Li) lie in
DRL (A2); (3) if Li lies in (DRA (A1)∩DRA (A2))∩ (DRL (A1)∪
DRL (A2)), all the locators in C(Li) lie inDRL (A1)∪DRL (A2).
4.2.1 Class 1 Wormhole Attack
When the sensor is under a class 1 wormhole attack as
shown in Figure 2(a), all the locators which can exchange
messages with the sensor via the wormhole link are D-
locators because they will bring the sensor incorrect dis-
tance measurements. To identify the V-locators and D-
locators, the sensor needs to check the conflicting sets of
its neighboring locators.
The procedure of neighboring locators differentiation un-
der the class 1 wormhole attack is described as follows:
1: Each locator periodically exchanges the Beacon mes-
sages with all its neighboring locators and builds its
conflicting set based on the received Beacon messages.
2: When receives the Loc req message from the sensor,
each locator replies a Loc ack message including its
conflicting set to the sensor.
3: The sensor builds the conflicting matrix and conducts
the mathematical operation.
4: for each neighboring locator Li do
5: if C(Li) , ∅ then
6: Add Li into LD;
7: else
8: Add Li into LV .
4.2.2 Class 2 Wormhole Attack
As shown in Figure 2(b), when the sensor is under a class
2 wormhole attack, only the locators in DRL (A1) are D-
locators. To identify all D-locators in this scenario, our al-
gorithm adopts the following identification schemes.
Identification scheme I1: When the sensor is under a class
2 wormhole attack, the locators which are detected by the
sensor with the packet unduplication property are consid-
ered as D-locators. As shown in Figure 2(b), L4 lies in
DRS (S ) ∩ DRL (A1). If it is detected by S with the packet
unduplication property, S determines that L4 is a D-locator.
Identification scheme I2: When under a class 2 wormhole
attack, if the sensor has two neighboring locators the dis-
tance between which is larger than 2RL, one of the two loca-
tors is a D-locator while the other is a V-locator. As the mes-
sage exchanged between the sensor and the D-locator trav-
els through the wormhole link, the response time is larger
than that of the V-locator. Therefore, the sensor considers
the locator with a shorter response time as a V-locator, and
the other locator is labeled as a D-locator. As shown in Fig-
ure 2(b), the distance between L2 and L8 is larger than 2RL,
the sensor determines that L2 (with a shorter response time)
is a V-locator and L8 is a D-locator (with a longer response
time).
Theorem 2. When the sensor is under a class 2 wormhole
attack and the length of the wormhole link is larger than
RA + RL, if ∃Li < LD such that C(Li) , ∅, then ∀L j ∈ C(Li),
L j ∈ LD.
Identification scheme I3: When the sensor detects that a
V-locator and a D-locator using identification scheme I2,
the V-locator Li cannot belong to LD. If Li’s conflicting set
C(Li) is not empty, the sensor considers all locators in C(Li)
as D-locators.
Theorem 3. When the sensor is under a class 2 wormhole
attack and the length of the wormhole link is larger than
RA +RL, if ∃Li < LD such that C(Li) , ∅, then ∀L j such that
Li ∈ C(L j), L j ∈ LD.
The proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 are omitted due to
space limitations, readers can refer to [31] for the details.
Identification scheme I4: When the sensor detects that a
V-locator and a D-locator using identification scheme I2,
the V-locator Li cannot belong to LD. If Li’s conflicting set
C(Li) is not empty, the locator which includes Li into its
conflicting set will be considered as a D-locator.
When the sensor detects that it is under the class 2 worm-
hole attack, it can identify all the D-locators based on the
above identification schemes. The procedure for identify-
ing the D-locators is shown as follows:
1: Each locator Periodically exchanges the Beacon mes-
sages with all its neighboring locators and builds its
conflicting set based on the received Beacon messages.
2: When receiving the Loc req message from the sensor,
each locator replies the Loc ack message including its
conflicting set to the sensor.
3: The sensor builds the conflicting matrix and conducts
the mathematical operation.
4: The sensor conducts schemes I1, I2, I3 and I4 to build
LD.
5: for each neighboring locator Li < LD do
6: Add Li into LV .
4.3 Secure Localization
After wormhole attack detection and neighboring loca-
tors differentiation, the sensor can identify some valid loca-
tors. However, among the dubious locators, there may exist
some locators which are also valid locators, such as L3, L4
and L5 in Figure 2(a) and L4 in Figure 2(b). Therefore, their
distance measurements can be used into localization. As
the sensor may receive multiple copies of the same mes-
sage from these locators, it will consider the one with the
shortest response time as the correct distance measurement.
For the distance measurements which are larger than R due
to the wormhole attack or measurement error, the sensor
filters them out before localization. At the end, the valid
distance measurements of the valid locators are used in the
MLE localization.
5 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulation results to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the SLAW. Particularly, we
evaluate the performance of the SLAW when the length
of the wormhole link varies. We model the general net-
work model as follows: when the distance d between two
nodes is less than αr, there is no packet loss; when d is
within [αr, r], the probability of packet loss is d−αrr−αr , where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Thus, if a node lies outside the transmission
range of a sender, this node cannot receive message from
the sender. We also assume the wormhole attack will drop
the received messages with a probability ω (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1).
The network settings are as following: the locators are de-
ployed independently with a density ρl = 0.006/m2 (with
the average degree around 4); the label L/RA of the x axis
denotes the ratio of the length of the wormhole link (i.e., the
distance between two attackers) to the transmission range of
the attacker; the transmission ranges of the sensors, locators
and attackers are set as RS = 13m, RL = 14m and RA = 15m
respectively; α = 0.75 and ω = 0.2. For simplicity, we as-
sume that the measurement error of the distance follows a
normal distribution N(µ, σ2) with the mean µ is 0 and the
standard deviation σ is within a threshold 0.5.
We repeat each simulation for 20,000 times by randomly
deploying locators with the Poisson distribution. The suc-
cessful probabilities of the wormhole attack detection pro-
cess and the secure localization process of SLAW are com-
pared with the one without any wormhole attack detection
procedure (labeled as “Without detection”) and other two
secure localization approaches: SeRLoc [8] and Consis-
tency [19]. The localization is considered as successful only
if derr1 ≤ derr2 + ftol ∗ RS , where derr1 (and derr2) denotes
the localization error with (and without) using the secure
localization scheme, ftol is the factor of localization error
tolerance (0.1 in our simulations).
Figure 4(a) shows the performance comparison of
SLAW and SeRLoc scheme [8] in terms of the probability
of successful wormhole attack detection. It is shown that
SLAW outperforms SeRLoc when L/RA ≤ 2 while there
is no difference when L/RA > 2. This is because SLAW
with the RSSI-based localization only improves the worm-
hole attack detection when the sensor is under the class 1
wormhole attack, which exists only when L/RA ≤ 2. It
shows that SLAW provides successful detection probability
at least 70% while SeRLoc is about 61% in the worst case.
When L/RA is large enough, the probability of successful
wormhole attack detection of SLAW approximates 90%.
Upon detecting the wormhole attack, the sensor adopts
one of the two differentiation algorithms to identify the du-
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Figure 4. Simulation results: (a) Probability
of successful wormhole detection in WSNs;
(b) Probability of fault alarm in the wormhole
attack detection process of SLAW; (c) Proba-
bility of successful localization in WSNs; (d)
Probability of secure localization under dif-
ferent locator densities in WSNs.
bious locators according to the type of the wormhole attack.
However, the sensor may make false alarm, i.e., it may iden-
tify incorrectly that it is under the class 2 wormhole attack
while it is actually under the class 1 wormhole attack. The
reason that false alarms occur is that the sensor may miss
some packets due to the transmission collisions or the ran-
dom drop-offs. Figure 4(b) demonstrates the probability of
false alarm when the sensor is under the wormhole attack.
It shows that the misidentification of the wormhole attack
happens only when L/RA is less than 2RA and the probabil-
ity is at most 1.2%.
Figure 4(c) shows the performance of successful local-
ization of SLAW, SeRLoc, Consistency and “Without de-
tection” schemes. The SeRLoc scheme identifies D-locators
using the sector uniqueness and communication range vio-
lation properties, then conducts self-localization based on
the rest locators. The consistency scheme identifies the
most inconsistent locator as a D-locator based on the con-
sistency check of the estimation result. The performance
of the “Without detection” scheme shows the severe impact
of the wormhole attack on the localization. Among these
schemes, SLAW obtains the best performance. The perfor-
mance of SLAW and SeRLoc increases with the increase
of L/RA while the performance of the consistency scheme
is insensitive to the value changes of L/RA. When L/RA is
larger than 3, the probability of successful localization gets
close to 100%.
Figure 4(d) shows the the performance of successful lo-
calization of SLAW under different locator densities. It
shows that the performance of SLAW improves greatly with
the enlargement of locator density when the length of the
wormhole link is less than 2RA. When the length of the
wormhole link is larger than 2RA, however, it seems that the
enlargement of locator density has no visible improvement.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we analyze the severe impacts of the worm-
hole attack on the localization in hostile wireless sensor
networks. To tackle this secure problem, we propose a
novel secure localization scheme SLAW which works well
under a general system model. We also conduct simula-
tions that demonstrate our scheme outperforms other exist-
ing schemes. In this paper, we only adopt the conserva-
tive strategy to handle the conflicting relationship among
neighboring locators. In our future work, we will apply the
topology inference theories to solve these conflicting rela-
tionships and make the conflicting sets of neighboring loca-
tors consistent and trustable. When a sensor is attacked by
multiple wormhole attacks simultaneously, it will be very
complicated and difficult to obtain secure localization. A
potential solution is to separate the localization from the
wormhole attack detection. That is, when multiple worm-
hole attacks are detected, the system can try to identify the
locations of the attackers and then eliminate them. Thus,
the other direction of our future work will focus on the de-
tection of multiple wormhole attacks and the localization of
the attackers.
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